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grounds for seeking review of issues not preserved in the trial court as necessitated by 
Rule 24(a)(5)(B) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.  Smith’s Pharmacy asserts 
that Ms. Baumann never noticed up for decision any request for leave to allow Ms. 
Baumann to extend discovery or to belatedly disclose or use an expert or expert report 
related to the standard of care for a pharmacy, any breach of that standard of care, or 
whether any such breach proximately caused her alleged injuries.  With regard to 
Smith’s Pharmacy, there is only one issue preserved and presented to the district court 
which may be addressed in Ms. Baumann’s appeal: 
1. Whether the district court correctly granted Smith’s Pharmacy summary judgment 
after determining the age of the case (Record (“R.”) 479-480), the history and 
record of the case (R.496; 479-480), and the expiration of all discovery (R.86-87), 
and after considering Ms. Baumann’s failures to: timely designate experts (R.86-
87), comply with representations in her answers to discovery (R.513-515), comply 
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R.525-529), comply with the stipulated 
scheduling order (R.86-87), follow the district court’s orders on briefing (R.402), 
and make out a prima facie case for her pharmacy malpractice claim (R.95-97; 526-
529). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW:  In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, an 
appellate court accords no deference to the district court’s legal conclusions but 
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examines them for correctness.  Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 102 (Utah 
1992); Schurtz v. BMW of North Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991).  
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, OR RULES  
See Addendum A attached hereto quoting, in relevant part, the following 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:  
56(b).  Summary Judgment. 
56(c).  Summary Judgment. 
7(c)(1).  Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda. 
16(d).  Pretrial conferences. 
37(e)(2).  Discovery and disclosure motions; Sanctions.  (2014)1 
37(h).  Discovery and disclosure motions; Sanctions.  (2014)2 
P. 29.  Stipulations regarding disclosure and discovery procedure. 
26(a)(4)(C).  General provisions governing disclosure and discovery.   
26(d)(4).  General provisions governing disclosure and discovery.   
                                                 
1 Renumbered May 1, 2015 to Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b). 
2 On May 1, 2015, Rule 37 was renumbered.  The version of Rule 37 in effect prior to 
May 1, 2015 is quoted in Addendum A. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Prior to this action, Kari Baumann’s claim arose in 2007, and she previously filed 
an initial lawsuit that was later dismissed.  Within the one year savings statute, the instant 
lawsuit was filed again in 2013.  R.479-480.  Ms. Baumann filed this action on February 
27, 2013, in the Fourth Judicial District Court.  R.1.  Ms. Baumann’s Complaint alleges 
health care provider negligence against Dr. Tayler and Smith’s Pharmacy and claims that 
the breach of the respective duties of Dr. Tayler and Smith’s Pharmacy constituted the 
proximate cause of Ms. Baumann’s alleged injury.  R.2-11.  After the expiration of Ms. 
Baumann’s expert designations deadline and the close of expert discovery, Defendants 
filed a Joint Motion for Summary Judgment.  During the first oral argument on November 
17, 2014, the district court ordered and explained to Plaintiff/Appellant that the date of 
Defendants’ Request to Submit for Decision or October 8, 2014 was the close of the 
pleadings on Defendants’ Joint Motion for Summary Judgment.  The district court did not 
re-open discovery.  Also at the first oral argument on November 17, 2014, the district 
court ordered and explained that it would continue the hearing to January 5, 2015 for the 
sole purpose of allowing Plaintiff pro se an opportunity to retain an attorney to make oral 
argument on her behalf on January 5, 2015, but that the attorney, if retained, was “not 
going to be at liberty to supplement this record.”  Plaintiff did not hire an attorney, and 
she appeared pro se on January 5, 2015, at the second hearing.  At the conclusion of the 
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second oral argument, the district court granted Smith’s Pharmacy and Dr. Tayler’s joint 
motion for summary judgment.  R.460.  On January 29, 2015, the district court executed 
and entered an Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Order of 
Final Judgment.  R.525-529. 
Ms. Baumann appealed, and the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that the “district 
court did not abuse its discretion....”  The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment 
granted by the lower court “[b]ecause the district court correctly precluded Baumann 
from using an undisclosed expert witness report to contest summary judgment under rule 
26(d)(4)….”  The Court of Appeals entered its opinion, from which Ms. Baumann takes this 
appeal, on July 29, 2016. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 
1. Ms. Baumann’s Complaint of February 27, 2013, alleges that she suffered an acute 
hypotensive event on February 4, 2007, as a result of being prescribed and having 
taken duplicative prescription blood pressure medications.  R.7-11. 
2. Prior to this instant action, Ms. Baumann’s claim had arisen in 2007, and she 
previously filed an initial lawsuit that was later dismissed upon stipulation of the 
parties.  Within the one year savings statute, the instant lawsuit was filed again 
February 27, 2013.  R.479-480. 
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3. In the subject February 27, 2013 Complaint, Ms. Baumann alleges a claim of 
medical negligence along with a claim for “breach of duty of informed consent” 
against Dr. Tayler.  R.5-7. 
4. With regard to each claim against Dr. Tayler, Ms. Baumann alleges that Dr. Tayler 
breached the applicable standard of care as a physician and that the breach was 
the proximate cause of Ms. Baumann’s injuries.  R.5-7. 
5. Regarding her claims against Smith’s Pharmacy, Ms. Baumann alleges that Smith’s 
Pharmacy breached the applicable standard of care expected from a pharmacy and 
that such a breach proximately caused injury.  R.2-5. 
6. At the time of her Complaint, Ms. Baumann was represented by counsel.  R.1. 
7. However, on June 19, 2013, Ms. Baumann’s counsel filed a Notice of Withdrawal.  
R.34-35. 
8. On June 19, 2013, the same day that Ms. Baumann’s counsel withdrew from this 
case, Dr. Tayler filed his Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint and the district court issued 
its Notice of Event Due Dates.  R.44. 
9. On June 21, 2013, Smith’s Pharmacy filed its Answer to the Complaint; and Notices 
to Appoint New Counsel or Appear in Person were served on Ms. Baumann and 
filed with the Court.  R.45-47 & 60-62. 
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10. Ms. Baumann filed a Notice of Appearance Pro Se on August 14, 2013.  R.63 & 66-
67. 
11. On March 7, 2014, consistent with Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
parties executed and filed a Stipulation for Additional Time to Conduct Standard 
Discovery.  R.84-87 & 98-106. 
12. The Stipulation for Additional Time to Conduct Standard Discovery, which was 
approved and signed by Ms. Baumann, specifically provided that “Plaintiff’s Rule 
26(a)(4)(A) expert disclosures shall be made no later than June 6, 2014.”  R.86, 100, 
102, & 104 (emphasis added).   
13. The Stipulation for Additional Time to Conduct Standard Discovery, signed by Ms. 
Baumann, also provided that “Expert discovery shall be completed by no later than 
September 5, 2014.”  R.86, 100, 102, & 104 (emphasis added). 
14. Defendants/Appellees specifically addressed those two expired deadlines with the 
district court at the summary judgment oral argument hearing on January 5, 2015.  
R.515-516. 
15. More than three months passed between the June 6, 2014 deadline for Ms. 
Baumann to serve and file her 26(a)(4)(A) expert disclosures and September 11, 
2014, when Smith’s Pharmacy and Dr. Tayler filed their joint Motion for Summary 
Judgment and demonstrated that Ms. Baumann did not file or serve-- and that Ms. 
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Baumann was now precluded from filing or serving-- any expert disclosures as 
required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or the Stipulation for Additional Time 
to Conduct Standard Discovery, and that without expert testimony Ms. Baumann 
cannot establish a prima facie case for her claims that the medical or pharmacy 
standards of care were breached or that any alleged breach by a health care 
provider proximately caused injury.  R.95-97 & 98-142. 
16. The joint Motion dated September 11, 2014, demonstrated to the district court 
the case was ripe for summary judgment and dismissal with prejudice as follows: 
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff failed to 
designate expert witnesses in the time mandated by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the Stipulation for Additional Time to Conduct Standard Discovery 
entered into by the parties.  Without expert testimony, Plaintiff cannot establish a 
prima facie case for her claims that the medical standard of care was breached, or 
that the pharmacy standard of care was breached, or that any breach in the 
standard of care for a healthcare provider proximately caused injury to the 
Plaintiff.  Accordingly, this action and the claims asserted therein should be 
dismissed with prejudice.   
R.95-97. 
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17. The Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants 
dated September 11, 2014, showed that under the history, timing, and 
circumstances of the case a lack of expert disclosures warranted summary 
judgment, as follows: 
A plaintiff who alleges a healthcare negligence claim can only establish a 
prima facie case through expert testimony that establishes: (1) the standard of 
care by which a healthcare provider’s conduct is to be measured; (2) the 
defendant’s breach of that standard; and (3) that such departure was the 
proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff.  Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1327 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).  
Each of these elements must be established through competent expert testimony 
to withstand summary judgment.  Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Ctr., 791 
P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 1990); Robb, 863 P.2d at 1325; Chadwick, 763 P.2d 821. 
A plaintiff’s failure to present evidence that, if believed by the trier of fact, 
would establish any one of the three prongs of the prima facie case 
justifies a grant of summary judgment to the defendant.  
 
Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).  Healthcare providers 
are not insurers or guarantors of results and an undesired outcome standing 
alone is not evidence of negligence.  Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 830 P.2d 
270, 273 (Utah 1992). 
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In this case, Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Stipulation for Additional Time to Conduct Standard Discovery required Plaintiff 
to serve her expert disclosures by June 6, 2014.  Plaintiff has not made any expert 
disclosures in the specialties of family medicine, cardiovascular health, 
neuroscience, pharmacy, or pharmacology to testify regarding the applicable 
standards of care, any alleged breach of a standard of care, and whether any such 
breach proximately caused Plaintiff’s alleged injury or damage.  Summary 
judgment, therefore, is appropriate and ripe because Plaintiff cannot establish 
the required elements of her claims. 
In summary, because Plaintiff has failed to make expert disclosures as 
required by Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Stipulation for 
Additional Time to Conduct Standard Discovery, there will be no expert testimony 
at trial that will establish a prima facie case against Dr. Tayler or Kroger/Smith’s 
Pharmacy for Plaintiff’s healthcare-based claims.  This action should, therefore, be 
summarily dismissed with prejudice. 
R.138-139; & 98-142. 
18. Appellant/Plaintiff’s September 29, 2014 “Statement Opposing Defendant’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment” and her attachments did not include any Rule 
26(a)(4)(A) expert designations or expert reports.  R.143-152.  
 14 
 
19. In her Statement Opposing the Defendants’ joint Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Appellant/Plaintiff (1) admits that she has not served any expert disclosures 
required by the URCP; (2) states that a ruling from the Social Security 
Administration in an unrelated matter is a basis for not granting Defendants’ 
motion; and (3) asserts that medical and other documents produced during 
discovery will allow Plaintiff to make a prima facie case of liability.  R.150-152. 
20. Dr. Tayler and Smith’s Pharmacy’s October 8, 2014 joint Reply Memorandum 
demonstrated that the matter was now ripe for Defendants’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment to be granted and Plaintiff’s claims to be dismissed, in light of the 
following: 
Rule 26(a)(4)(c)(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he 
party who bears the burden of proof on the issue for which expert testimony is 
offered shall serve on the other parties the information required by [Rule 
26(a)(4)(A)] within seven days after the close of fact discovery.”  Rule 26(d)(4) 
further provides that if a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26, “that 
party may not use the undisclosed witness, document or material at any hearing 
or trial unless the failure is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure.”  
Additionally, Rule 37(h) states that “[i]f a party fails to disclose a witness, 
document or other material … that party shall not be permitted to use the witness, 
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document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless 
or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose.  In addition to or in lieu 
of this sanction, the court on motion may take any action authorized under [Rule 
37(e)(2)].”  
Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the time her Complaint was filed.  
On June 19, 2013, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Notice of Withdrawal.  On that same 
day, the Court issued its Notice of Event Due Dates.  As a consequence of the 
formal withdrawal of Plaintiff’s counsel, the discovery event due dates issued by 
the Court were delayed.  Subsequent to Plaintiff filing her Notice of Appearance 
Pro Se, the parties entered into a Stipulation for Additional Time to Conduct 
Standard Discovery (the “Stipulation”).  The Stipulation clearly states that it was 
being amended to account for the “additional 85 days provided for the service of 
Plaintiff’s initial disclosures …”  As shown above, Rule 26(a)(4)(c)(i) requires that 
the party with the burden of proof serve expert disclosures within seven days of 
the close of fact discovery.  Because the parties stipulated that fact discovery was 
to be completed no later than May 30, 2014, the Stipulation clearly indicated for 
Plaintiff that she was to make her Rule 26(a)(4)(A) expert disclosures seven days 
thereafter, on June 6, 2014.  The Notice of Event Due Dates served by the Court 
simply included a deadline by which all expert discovery was to be completed.  
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Contrary to Plaintiff’s suggestion that the insertion of Plaintiff’s expert disclosure 
deadline was “misleading” or in violation of the Standards of Professionalism and 
Civility, inclusion of the deadline clarified to Plaintiff when her expert disclosures 
were to be served in order to comply with the requirements of Rule 26(a)(4)(A) – 
specifically, that her expert disclosures were to be made within seven days of the 
close of fact discovery, a legally mandated deadline not included in the Court’s 
Notice of Event Due Dates. 
Plaintiff’s opposition affirms that she has not made and cannot make any 
expert disclosures required by Rule 26.  There is no evidence that Plaintiff has any 
expert information to disclose as required by Rule 26(a)(4)(A).  “In general, a pro 
se document ‘is to be liberally construed . . . [H]owever, inartfully pleaded, it must 
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and 
can only be dismissed . . . if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no 
set of facts in support [of her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief.”  McNair v. 
State, 2014 UT App 127, ¶ 12, 328 P.3d 874 (citation omitted).  Here, liberally 
construing Plaintiff’s opposition, there are no facts showing in any way that 
Plaintiff has made or can make expert disclosures. The fact that Plaintiff has had a 
ruling before the Social Security Administration is irrelevant to this case and does 
not provide any basis for an ability to make expert disclosures in this case.  Further, 
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while medical documents and other discovery have been exchanged, to withstand 
summary judgment, Utah law clearly requires Plaintiff to set forth expert 
testimony to establish (1) the standard of care by which a health care provider’s 
conduct is to be measured; (2) the defendant’s breach of that standard; and (3) 
that such departure was the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff.  Robb v. 
Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1322-27 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 
P.2d 817, 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Ctr., 791 
P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 1990).  Because it appears beyond any doubt that Plaintiff has 
failed to serve or is able to serve expert disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(4)(A), 
Defendants’ Motion should be granted and the Plaintiff’s action should be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
Plaintiff has failed to make any expert disclosures in the time mandated by 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Stipulation for Additional Time to 
Conduct Standard Discovery entered into by the parties.  Without expert 
testimony, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case for her claims, viz., that the 
medical standard of care was breached, that the pharmacy standard of care was 
breached, or that any breach in the standard of care for a health care provider 
proximately caused injury to the Plaintiff.  Accordingly, Defendants respectfully 
requested that the action and claims asserted therein be dismissed with prejudice. 
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R.153-158. 
21. About nine (9) months before Defendants Dr. Tayler and Smith’s Pharmacy filed 
their joint Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants/Appellees served Ms. 
Baumann on December 18, 2013, with interrogatories and requests for production 
of documents entitled “First Set of Combined Discovery Requests of Defendants 
Gregory P. Tayler, M.D., and The Kroger Company dba Smith’s Pharmacy #40063 
to Plaintiff.”  R.78-79. 
22. On February 20, 2014, Ms. Baumann signed and served her Responses, and on 
February 21, 2014, she filed her certificate of service entitled “Plaintiff’s Responses 
to First Set of Combined Discovery Requests of Defendants Gregory P. Tayler, MD 
and The Kroger Company dba Smith’s Pharmacy #40063”.  R.82-83. 
23. At the January 5, 2015, oral argument hearing on Defendants’/Appellees’ motion 
for summary judgment, the district court reviewed the pertinent portions of Ms. 
Baumann’s signed Responses to the combined discovery requests.  R.513- 515. 
24. In Plaintiff’s Responses, signed on February 20, 2014, Ms. Baumann verified-- in 
more than one answer-- that she would comply with the case management order 
and identify her experts and their testimony when scheduled to do so by the 
scheduling order rather than answer the interrogatories or requests for production 
 19 
 
of documents which requested the names of her experts and production of expert 
reports.  R.513- 515. 
25. At the January 5, 2015, oral argument hearing on Defendants’/Appellees’ motion 
for summary judgment, the district court received a complete copy of Ms. 
Baumann’s signed Responses.  R.514. 
26. On page five of Ms. Baumann’s Responses, Ms. Baumann’s sworn Response to 
Interrogatory No. 13 was as follows:  “Plaintiff will identify such witnesses and their 
anticipated testimony as requested when scheduled to do so by case management 
order.” (emphasis added)  R.514. 
27. The district court’s attention at the second (or January 5th) oral argument hearing 
was next directed to Interrogatory No. 15, which asked:  “Identify each person you 
intend to call as a witness in the trial or arbitration of this action including expert 
witnesses specifying for each their name, address, telephone number, occupation, 
and a brief summary of their expected testimony.”  (emphasis added)    R.514. 
28. Ms. Baumann’s sworn Response to Interrogatory No. 15 was:  “See Answer No. 13 
[i.e., “Plaintiff will identify such [expert] witnesses and their anticipated testimony 
as requested when scheduled to do so by case management order.”].”  R.513-514. 
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29. The district court’s attention at the second oral argument was further directed to 
page eight of Ms. Baumann’s Responses which she signed on February 20, 2014.  
R.513. 
30. On page eight, Request for Production of Documents No. 10 requested the 
following:  “Produce a copy of all documents, reports, or opinions you have received 
from each expert witness you intend to call to testify at the trial or arbitration of 
this action.” (emphasis added)    R.513. 
31. Again, Ms. Baumann’s sworn Response to Request for Production of Documents 
No. 10 was:  “Plaintiff will produce request No. 10 when scheduled to do so by case 
management order.”  (emphasis added)  R.513. 
32. On page nine is Ms. Baumann’s signature.  R.513. 
33. In light of the age of the case, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the deadlines in 
the Stipulation for Additional Time to Conduct Standard Discovery signed by Ms. 
Baumann, Ms. Baumann’s promises made in her signed Responses to written 
discovery, and the court’s rulings at the first oral argument on November 17, 2015, 
Smith’s Pharmacy asserted to the district court at the second, or the January 5, 
2015, oral argument: “Your Honor, without expert testimony, the Plaintiff cannot 
establish a prima facie case for her medical malpractice case for her medical 
malpractice claims, healthcare malpractice claims.  She cannot establish the 
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standard of care for a doctor or a pharmacy.  She cannot establish breach, and she 
cannot establish whether any alleged breach caused injury.”  R.513.  “For … these 
reasons this case is ripe to be dismissed with prejudice and for summary judgment 
to be granted.”  R.513. 
34. Smith’s Pharmacy reminded the district court at the second oral argument hearing 
that: “By order of this court [at the first oral argument] on November 17th, 2014, 
Ms. Baumann is not permitted [to] argue or submit anything to the court beyond 
the date on which the Defendants filed their request to submit for decision which 
was on October 8th, 2014.  Any filings by the Plaintiff subsequent to that date are 
by court order precluded to be considered by the court.”  R.512-513. 
35. At the second oral argument, the district court confirmed with Ms. Baumann that 
she understood the court’s intention at the first oral argument to not allow 
consideration of any belated or impermissible memoranda or other filings, but 
rather to limit the filings to only the Defendants’/Appellees’ summary judgment 
motion, the opposition, and the reply:   “THE COURT:  Did you misunderstand the 
Court’s intention to limit the argument to the motion and the opposition and only 
the reply?  MS. BAUMANN:  No, I do understand that….”  (emphasis added)  R.507. 
36. At the first oral argument hearing on November 17, 2014, the husband of Plaintiff 
pro se, Mr. Spain, who is not a lawyer, had attempted to speak for and argue on 
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behalf of Plaintiff pro se, at which point the district court stated: “I don’t know that 
I have the ability to let you speak for her if you’re not a licensed attorney.”  The 
district court further expressed its concern over Mr. Spain’s participation as 
follows: “I really cannot do this because while your [Mr. Spain’s] motive may be 
correct and pure, in principal you may do more harm than good not being a 
licensed attorney.  That’s the concern.”  R.482-483. 
37. In response, the following conversation ensued between the district court and Ms. 
Baumann, Plaintiff pro se: “The difference is she [Ms. Baumann] is entitled to do 
this under constitutional protection.  She’s not required to have an attorney, but if 
you have the assistance of an individual, there ought to be somebody that’s 
licensed in the law.  Perhaps she could get an assistance of a pro bono attorney.  
What I would – hate to do this but I think I would be inclined to continue the 
hearing to allow you to secure an attorney if you wish or to proceed at this time 
yourself, Ms. Baumann. * * * The choice is yours.”  R.481. 
38. Ms. Baumann responded during the first oral argument that she had already tried 
unsuccessfully to obtain counsel.  R.481. 
39. The district court in turn offered: “If you can – if you want a continuance to try to 
get a pro bono attorney, I would probably grant you some time to do that.  
Otherwise, you can proceed today yourself.”  R.481. 
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40. Ms. Baumann:  “I will take the continuance.”  R.481. 
41. After insights on the case’s history by the attorneys for the Defendants/ Appellees 
relevant to the question of whether the district court should continue the 
summary judgment hearing (R.479-480), the district court held as follows: “Well, 
okay then.  I understand the issue completely.  I’m going to continue the hearing.  
I think that being pro se Ms. Baumann probably would not maybe – maybe would 
not fully appreciate that she could not have her husband speak for her….  I 
therefore think that she’s entitled to some time in which to try to secure an 
attorney to speak for her.  At the same time, that attorney’s not going to be at 
liberty to supplement this record.  The motion – the pleadings have closed on the 
motion, so the issue is getting somebody here to speak on the question and that 
which has been filed to date [October 8, 2014].” (emphasis added)  R.478-480. 
42. The district court merely reset the first oral argument hearing on November 17, 
2014 to January 5, 2015 to permit Plaintiff pro se one final opportunity to retain a 
lawyer, and that if she was unable to obtain a lawyer by the second hearing she 
must “plan on speaking yourself to the question” and “stand at the lectern”, but 
that if she would like she “may simply write your statement.”  There was no other 
ground for the continuance.  R.478-480.  
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43. The district court ensured that Plaintiff/Appellant understood what the court 
meant: “THE COURT: Yes. Let me ask her if she understands.  Do you understand 
what I mean?  MS. BAUMANN: Yes, I do, Your Honor.” (emphasis added)  R.477. 
44. The district court did not continue the first hearing to permit late or additional 
filings by Plaintiff/Appellant beyond October 8, 2014, the date the Defendants/ 
Appellees appropriately and timely filed their Request to Submit for Decision the 
joint motion for summary judgment.  R.472 & 476; 159-162. 
45. Anything filed after October 8, 2014 is contrary to the motion practice rule.  R.474. 
46. “MR. HILBIG:  So everything filed [by] October 8 will be part of the record.  Anything 
filed subsequent to that date will not be considered by the court.  THE COURT:  
That’s correct.”  (emphasis added)  R.476; 468-478. 
47. Plaintiff/Appellant elected to continue the hearing and take advantage of the 
court’s offer to allow her to obtain counsel in the interim, but the court once again 
clarified to Plaintiff/Appellant its prior decision to limit the summary judgment 
motion pleadings to what the rules of procedure allow.  “THE COURT: You want to 
argue today?  MS. BAUMANN: No.  THE COURT: You want to continue the hearing?  
MS. BAUMANN: Yes, please.  THE COURT:  All right.  Thank you.  I’ll stand on the 
previous decision. October 8th [2014] will be the close of the pleadings, and we’ll 
give you 30 days in which to secure counsel.”  (emphasis added)  R.472-473. 
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48. “THE COURT: And, again, if you’re unable to – for some reason cannot do this [i.e., 
secure counsel], I’ll entertain a written oral statement.  It’s not a pleading.  It would 
be considered your oral statement if you have difficulty speaking.  I’ll consider it 
only for that purpose.”  R.470. 
49. According to the “Minutes Oral Argument in Provo”, the “Court closes the 
pleadings on the Motion for Summary Judgment as of 10/8/2014.”  (emphasis 
added)  R.388. 
50. The rulings the court issued during the November 17, 2014 hearing are detailed in 
the court’s Order entered on December 22, 2014.  R.400-402.   
51. The December 22, 2014 court-executed Order explicitly explains that:  
“None of Plaintiff’s current or future memoranda, briefs, reports, 
correspondence, emails, pleadings, or filings of any nature filed 
subsequent to October 8, 2014, which is the date of Defendants’ originally 
filed Request to Submit for Decision, whether filed as a pro se or 
potentially represented Plaintiff, have been or will be considered by the 
Court prior to, during, or after oral argument on January 5, 2015, nor have 
they been or will be permitted to be considered by the Court in deciding 
the joint Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants The Kroger 
Company dba Smith’s Pharmacy #40063 and Gregory Tayler, M.D.” 
 
R.401.  
 
52. In light of the court’s November 17, 2014 orders (entered on December 22, 2014), 
the district court would not consider any documents filed after October 8, 2014, 
which includes the following: 
 26 
 
 Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Statement Opposing Defendants’ 
Motion for Summary Judgment --  filed October 10, 2014; 
 
 Plaintiff’s URCP 26 Expert Report in Response to Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Statement Opposing Defendants’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment --  filed November 17, 2014; or, 
 
 Request for Admission of Plaintiff’s URCP 26 Expert Report and CV to the 
Document Record in Response to Defendants’ Amended Request to 
Submit for Decision --  filed November 17, 2014. 
 
R.401; 325; 383; & 386.  
 
53. Pursuant to court Order, the only documents the district court was to consider in 
deciding Defendants’ Joint Motion include the following:  
 Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants The Kroger Company dba 
Smith’s Pharmacy #40063 and Gregory Tayler, M.D. dated September 11, 
2014; (R.97) 
 
 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants 
The Kroger Company dba Smith’s Pharmacy #40063 and Gregory Tayler, 
M.D. dated September 11, 2014;  (R.142) 
 
 Plaintiff’s Statement Opposing Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment Hearing Requested dated September 29, 2014; (R.152) 
 
 Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of 
Defendants The Kroger Company dba Smith’s Pharmacy #40063 and 
Gregory Tayler, M.D. dated October 8, 2014; (R.158) and, 
 
 Request to Submit for Decision (Oral Argument Requested) dated October 
8, 2014.  (R.162) 
 
R.401. 
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54. On the above-discussed two conditions, that the pleadings had closed October 8, 
2014, and that Plaintiff pro se had one more opportunity to find an attorney for 
oral argument, the district court continued, for Ms. Baumann’s benefit, the oral 
argument from November 17, 2015 to January 5, 2015.  R.472. 
55. At the second oral argument for summary judgment on January 5, 2015, Plaintiff 
appeared unrepresented, and Smith’s Pharmacy verbally reaffirmed to the district 
court as follows:  “So in summary, based on the rules of procedure, based on the 
most recent scheduling order which gave the Plaintiff the benefit of clarifying 
exactly what date [her] designation and reports were due, and based on the 
written briefing as well as this court’s orders, the Defendants respectfully request 
that the court dismiss summarily the case brought by Ms. Baumann.  Thank you.”  
R.499-500. 
56. The district court verbally ruled from the bench that: 
“In this [Ms. Baumann’s] case, the appropriate standard of care for a physician 
prescribing medication and for a pharmacy filling that prescription does not lie 
within the common knowledge of the layperson.  Also, the harmful effects [i.e., 
causation and damages], of any potential overdose of that medication lies outside 
of common knowledge as well.” 
 
R.496. 
 
57. The district court further concluded from the bench that: 
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“Given the history and the record” the “Plaintiff has failed to provide the required 
expert testimony as to the standard of care, breach, and causation.” 
 
R.496. 
58. As recorded in the district court’s “Minutes Oral Argument in Provo” on January 5, 
2015, the district court granted Defendants’ Motion.  R.460. 
59. The district court’s Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Order of Final Judgment, signed on January 29, 2015, states in part as follows: 
“[F]ollowing briefing by the parties, the Court, the Honorable Fred. D. Howard 
presiding, heard oral argument on the joint Motion for Summary Judgment of 
Defendants….  The court entertained extensive oral argument from the parties and 
reviewed (1) the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of 
Defendants … filed on September 11, 2014; (2) Plaintiff’s Statement Opposing 
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment filed on September 29, 2014; (3) the 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants 
… filed on October 8, 2014; and (4) Plaintiff’s Statement for Continuation Opposing 
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Exclusion of Evidence filed by 
Plaintiff on January 5, 2015 with permission of the Court and which the Court 
considered in lieu of oral argument by Plaintiff.  In accordance with the Court’s 
Order dated December 22, 2014, all other papers served or filed by Plaintiff after 
October 8, 2014 were not considered by the Court because those papers were filed 
after Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment had been fully briefed and 
submitted for decision and were, consequently, untimely filed in violation of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Stipulation for Additional Time to Conduct 
Standard Discovery entered by the parties. 
After hearing and carefully considering the arguments of the parties and the 
legal issues to be addressed, and having construed all facts and reasonable 
inferences to be made therefrom in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court 
finds that Plaintiff failed to make expert disclosures as required by the Stipulation 
for Additional Time to Conduct Standard Discovery and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and there is no good cause for Plaintiff’s failure to make expert 
disclosures.  Therefore, Plaintiff was precluded by Rule 26(d)(4) from using any 
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undisclosed witness, document, or material in opposition to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed by the Defendants.  The Court acknowledges that in some 
healthcare malpractice cases, the applicable standard of care, and whether a 
breach of that standard of care occurred and proximately caused a claimant’s 
injuries, may be within the common knowledge of laypersons.  In this case, 
however, Plaintiff’s claims are based on alleged overmedication of blood pressure 
medication.  The standards of care related to prescribing and dispensing blood 
pressure medication, and what neurological or other biological effects that blood 
pressure medications may have, are not within the common knowledge of 
laypersons.  The Court, therefore, finds that expert testimony is required in this 
case to set forth the applicable standards of care and whether any breach of those 
standards of care occurred and proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries.  
Consequently, Plaintiff, having failed to make expert disclosures required by the 
Stipulation for Additional Time to Conduct Standard Discovery and Rule 26 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, cannot make a prima facie case for her healthcare 
malpractice claims; viz., that the medical standard of care was breached, that the 
pharmacy standard of care was breached, or that any breach of a standard of care 
for a health care or pharmacy provider proximately caused injury to the Plaintiff, 
each of which must be established by expert testimony.  Robb v. Anderton, 863 
P.2d 1322, 1325-27 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 821 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Ctr., 791 P.2d 193, 195 
(Utah 1990). 
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED & DECREED that the joint 
Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants The Kroger Company dba Smith’s 
Pharmacy #40063 and Gregory P. Tayler, M.D. is granted, that all of Plaintiff’s 
claims against both Defendants are dismissed with prejudice, and that the granting 
of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is dispositive of this case.” 
 
R.525-529. 
60. Ms. Baumann retained counsel who appeared on January 16, 2015, and filed a 
Notice of Appeal on January 29, 2015.  R.461-4622; 530-531. 
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61. On May 18, 2016, the Utah Court of Appeals held oral argument; and on July 29, 
2016, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its decision.  See Addendum B, Baumann 
v. The Kroger Co. and Gregory P. Tayler, 381 P.3d 1135 (Utah Ct. App. 2016). 
62. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion, and because the district 
court appropriately precluded--under rule 26(d)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure--Baumann from using her undisclosed expert witness report (which 
Baumann filed twenty-five weeks after the close of fact discovery, several months 
after the expiration of expert disclosures, two months after expert discovery 
cutoff, and five weeks after the court had cut off dispositive motion filing) to 
contest summary judgment, the Court of Appeals affirmed.  Addendum B, 
Baumann, 381 P.3d at 1141. 
63. Ms. Baumann filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on August 22, 2016. 
64. On September 26, 2016, Dr. Tayler and Smith’s Pharmacy filed their respective 
Oppositions to Ms. Baumann’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari.   
65. This Court issued an Order dated October 31, 2016 granting Petitioner’s Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
This Court should affirm the Court of Appeals which found that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion and justifiably granted summary judgment in favor of Smith’s 
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Pharmacy.  Ms. Baumann failed to preserve for appeal the issue of whether the district 
court abused its discretion; the district court never excluded an expert inasmuch as none 
had ever properly existed. 
The URCP sustain the district court’s reasonable and proper use of discretion after 
the expiration of all discovery to close the pleadings on and grant summary judgment.  
The comparison of Coroles to Baumann is inapposite because in Ms. Baumann’s case by 
the time she attempted to improperly file a report, without leave, expert discovery and 
the summary judgment briefings and filings had already closed.  The principles in Sleepy 
Holdings v. Mountain West apply as do Rules 26(a) and Rule 26(d). 
The decision of the SSA is irrelevant to the issue presented by Smith’s Pharmacy 
and Dr. Tayler’s joint motion for summary judgment.  A decision by the SSA determining 
the existence of disability does not review the standards of care related to a pharmacy, 
whether a breach occurred, and whether a claimant’s disability was proximately caused 
by a breach.  A decision of the SSA does not provide the expert information required to 
be disclosed by Rule 26(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Ms. Baumann’s pro se representation has no impact on this appeal.  While a self-
represented party is entitled to every consideration that may reasonably be indulged, a 
party who represents herself will be held to the same standard of knowledge and practice 
as any qualified member of the bar. 
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The district court did not abuse its discretion in its application of Rules 7, 56, and 
26(d).  There is more than a sufficient evidentiary basis in the record of how the district 
court governed this case, discovery, and briefing on summary judgment to conclude that 
the district court’s application of the rules of procedure was not abusive at all, let alone 
clearly abusive.  The Utah Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the district court.  This Court 
should affirm. 
ARGUMENT 
 
I.  MS. BAUMANN FAILED TO PRESERVE FOR APPEAL THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE 
DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT CONSIDERING BELATEDLY 
FILED EXPERT REPORT FILED AFTER CLOSE OF ALL DISCOVERY AND BRIEFING. 
 
As a general matter, “to preserve an issue for appeal, the party asserting error 
must (1) specifically raise the issue; (2) ‘in a timely manner;’ and (3) support the claim 
with ‘evidence and relevant legal authority.’”3  In other words, an issue is preserved for 
appeal when it has been “presented to the district court in such a way that the court has 
an opportunity to rule on [it].”4  This standard applies unless there are exceptional 
circumstances or plain error.5  “The exceptional-circumstances doctrine ‘is a concept 
                                                 
3 Salt Lake City Corp. v. Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84, ¶ 26, 299 P.3d 990 (quoting 
Donjuan v. McDermott, 2011 UT 72, ¶ 20, 266 P.2d 839). 
4 J.M.W. v. T.I.Z. (In Re Adoption of Baby E.Z.), 2011 UT 38, ¶ 25, 266 P.3d 702 (internal 
quotation marks omitted)(emphasis added).   
5 Id. (citation omitted).   
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that is used sparingly, and [is] properly reserved for truly exceptional situations, for 
cases … involving rare procedural anomalies.’”6  Further, the exceptional-circumstances 
doctrine is reserved for “the most unusual circumstances where [the] failure to consider 
an issue that was not properly preserved for appeal would [] result[] in manifest 
injustice.”7  The plain error exception requires that a party demonstrate “that (i) an 
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome.”8  Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has clarified: 
Our preservation rule promotes both judicial economy and 
fairness. The rule furthers judicial economy by giving the 
district court an opportunity to address the claimed error, 
and if appropriate, correct it prior to an appeal. Next, it 
encourages fairness by giving an opposing party an 
opportunity to address the alleged error in the district court. 
Similarly, the rule prevents a party from avoiding an issue at 
trial for strategic reasons only to raise the issue on appeal if 
the strategy fails.  
 
Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
complements the preservation rule. It requires an appellant’s 
brief to provide “a statement of the issues presented for 
review” and a “citation to the record showing that [an] issue 
                                                 
6 State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, ¶ 19, 789 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (quoting State v. Kozlov, 
2012 UT App 114, ¶ 35, 276 P.3d 1207 (omission in original) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)).   
7 Id. (quoting State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ¶ 23, 94 P.3d 186. 
8 Meadow Valley Contrs., Inc. v. State DOT, 2011 UT 35, ¶ 17, 266 P.3d 671 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 34 
 
was preserved in the [district] court.” However, in the case 
of appellant who appears pro se, we retain discretion to 
address issues raised that do not strictly comply with the 
requirements of Rule 24.9 
 
Finally, Rule 24(a)(5)(B) requires that a party provide a statement of grounds for seeking 
review of an issue not preserved in the district court. 
In this case, the issues Ms. Baumann seeks review of on appeal with regard to her 
claims against Smith’s Pharmacy are whether “the Court of Appeals erred in concluding 
that the District Court properly applied Rule 26(d)(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, rather 
than Rule 16(d), to its determination of the appropriate sanction for Appellant’s failure to 
timely disclose expert testimony,” and whether “the Court of Appeals erred in concluding 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Appellant from using an 
untimely expert report under Rule 26(d) to contest summary judgment when it excluded 
the report based only on a finding that the failure to disclose was not justified”.10  
However, Ms. Baumann, does not provide adequate citation to the record showing that 
these issues, as stated, were preserved in the district court--in a timely manner, with 
evidence and legal authority, and presented to the court in a way the district court had 
                                                 
9  On appeal, Ms. Baumann is represented by an attorney.  Therefore, the discretion 
retained to an appellate court regarding a pro se appellant’s compliance with Rule 24 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure does not exist in this case. 
10 Aplt’s Br., pp. 1 - 2.   
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an opportunity to rule on it.  Ms. Baumann also fails to set forth a statement of grounds 
for seeking review of the unpreserved issues.  Ms. Baumann’s Brief admits on the one 
hand that she was over five months (June 2014 to November 2014) late in filing a first 
ever “expert report … applicable to the alleged breaches and failures by the Pharmacy,” 
on the eve of “oral argument” 11, i.e., well after the close of the briefing allowed by the 
district court, but Ms. Baumann then attempts on the other hand to assert, without 
having preserved the issue, that the district court’s “excluding the untimely expert report 
… would … be an abuse of discretion” and that the District Court applied Rule 26(d)(4) but 
should have applied Rule 16(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.12  Ms. Baumann 
asserts that Coroles v. State, 349 P.3d 739 (Utah 2015), applies to Ms. Baumann’s situation 
and that thus “the District Court committed reversible error when it excluded the 
untimely expert witness report submitted by Ms. Baumann”, that “excluding the untimely 
expert report … would … be an abuse of discretion”, and that accordingly “this Court 
should reverse the District Court’s exclusion of the untimely expert report submitted by 
Ms. Baumann.”13   
                                                 
11 Id. at 10.   
12 Id. at 15 & 18 (emphasis added).   
13 Id. at 18 (emphasis added).   
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Ms. Baumann failed to preserve for appeal the issue of excluding an expert.  The 
District Court never considered any experts, or requests for leave to file expert reports by 
Ms. Baumann, because fact and expert discovery had fully closed, the joint motion for 
summary judgment was before the district court, and all the briefing on the motion had 
closed on October 8, 2014.  There was never a timely or permitted expert designation, 
expert report, or request for leave to designate late experts or file late expert reports for 
the District Court to have stricken or excluded. 
In deciding summary judgment, the District Court did not exclude any expert 
report.  The summary judgment was fully briefed and ready for oral argument before 
there was ever any indication of any expert report, and leave was never sought to submit 
an expert report before briefing was closed.  Ms. Baumann’s attempt now on appeal to 
argue an issue that Ms. Baumann never preserved--i.e., that the district court somehow 
excluded a report--  is contrary to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.  Rule 24(a)(5)(A) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure required Ms. Baumann to have made “citation 
to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court.”  Ms. Baumann did 
not, and could not, make such a citation.  Such a citation is not feasible because the district 
court never ruled on, or made an order, excluding Plaintiff’s first ever expert report which 
was filed not just extremely late but after the summary judgment motion briefings had 
been closed by the court on October 8, 2014.  Besides scheduling orders, the only rulings 
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and Orders entered by the district court were: 1) to cap the briefing and filings pertinent 
to the Defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure (viz., motion/memorandum, opposition, and reply/request to submit), and 2) 
to grant summary judgment and order dismissal with prejudice.  Therefore, the only 
preserved issue for appeal is Defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment. 
In stark contrast to Ms. Baumann’s case, the issue reviewed in Coroles was a trial 
court’s striking two separate sets of experts.  That trial court struck the first set of experts 
who had been designated on time according to the scheduling order.  That trial court also 
struck a second replacement set filed after the designation date but before expert 
discovery expired.  Because experts (all filed before designation or expert cutoff) no longer 
existed, the trial court considered and granted summary judgment and dismissed the 
plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim.  Coroles, 349 P.3d at 741.  The Coroles scenario was  
significantly different than Ms. Baumann’s situation in which the district court did not 
strike any expert for there was never any trace of an expert until after the expert 
designation deadline, the expert discovery cutoff, and the briefing on summary judgment 
had all expired.  In Coroles, the trial court struck the plaintiff’s experts disclosed before 
expert cutoff, and then summary judgment was considered and granted.  Yet in Ms. 
Baumann’s case, the trial court considered all timely documents filed for summary 
judgment and granted the motion, the issue of leave to file late experts having never 
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arisen at summary judgment and having never become an appealable issue.  Only after 
all summary judgment briefing was completed did Ms. Baumann make attempt to file an 
expert report.  No striking of experts occurred in Ms. Baumann’s case at the district court 
level, and thus no preservation of such an issue has occurred for the appellate courts. 
 Ms. Baumann also cites Welsh v. Hospital Corp. of Utah, 2010 UT App 171, ¶ 10, 
235 P.3d 791, for the proposition that “excluding a witness from testifying is … extreme 
in nature and … should be employed only with caution and restraint” and for the 
suggestion that it may be an abuse of discretion for the trial court to exclude an expert 
report if, under the circumstances, justice and fairness require that the court allow a party 
to designate witnesses after the court-imposed deadline for doing so has expired.14  
However, the issue reviewed in Welsh was a trial court’s denial of a Motion for 
Enlargement of Time to designate expert witnesses and submit expert reports.15  Again, 
the record in this case is devoid of any request made by Ms. Baumann, prior to completion 
of the summary judgment briefing, to the district court for an enlargement of time to 
allow her to submit expert reports related to her claims against either Dr. Tayler or Smith’s 
Pharmacy.  A request made by Ms. Baumann to the district court to consider expert 
reports was filed on December 15, 2014—well over six months after Ms. Baumann’s 
                                                 
14 Aplt’s Br., p. 19.   
15 2010 UT App 171, ¶ 1. 
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expert designations were due (June 6, 2014) and well over two months subsequent to the 
deadline (October 8, 2014) the district court had closed all briefing and filings on the 
Defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment.16  But Ms. Baumann’s request was 
nonetheless moot under the district court’s previous November 17, 2014 rulings and 
orders.  The issue Ms. Baumann seeks review of on appeal was simply not preserved 
inasmuch as there never was any exclusion of experts. 
Finally, Ms. Baumann’s appellate brief does not contain supported or persuasive 
argument related to whether exceptional circumstances or plain error exist showing that 
this unpreserved issue should be reviewed on appeal.  Consequently, to the extent that 
Ms. Baumann desires review of an unpreserved issue, her brief is inadequate pursuant to 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure because it does not contain 
supportable or convincing contentions or developed reasoning, with citation to 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record, showing that the unpreserved issue should 
be reviewed on appeal.17 
                                                 
16 R.395-391.   
17 Isom, 2015 UT App 160, ¶ 17, confirms that Rule 24(a)(9) requires an appellant’s brief 
to “contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented, … with citation to the authorities statutes, and parts of the record relied on.” 
The Isom opinion, further directs that “[b]riefs require not just bald citation to authority 
but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority” and 
that “[a]n issue is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so 
lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court.” Id. 
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The February 19, 2016 Utah Court of Appeals opinion of Robinson v. Jones Waldo 
provides additional guidance.  Robinson v. Jones Waldo, 369 P.3d 119 (Utah Ct. App. 
2016)(affirming the defendant’s motion for summary judgment against a pro se 
plaintiff).  Under the principles of Robinson, Ms. Baumann’s pro se status did not excuse 
her from making adequate or timely expert designations or reports, or from being held 
to “the same standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified member of the bar.”  
Id. at 127.  Also, as in Robinson, Ms. Baumann “did not present to the district court the 
arguments [she] now raises on appeal.  Because [Baumann] did not present [her] claims 
in such a way that the court could rule on them, they are not preserved.  Because the 
challenges are unpreserved, [the appellate court] deemed them waived.”  Id.  Ms. 
Baumann’s attempt to assert the district court struck experts should be deemed waived, 
and the district court and Court of Appeals should thus be affirmed. 
                                                 
(quotation marks and citations omitted).  Finally, Isom affirms that “‘[i]t is well settled 
that issues raised by an appellant in the reply brief that were not presented in the 
opening brief are  considered waived and will not be considered by the appellate 
court.’” Id. ¶ 16 (quoting Allen v. Friel¸ 2008 UT 56, ¶ 8, 194 P.3d 903).   
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II. RULES 7, 56, 16, 37, AND 26 OF THE URCP SUSTAIN THE DISTRICT COURT’S 
DECISIONS AND USE OF DISCRETION, SLEEPY HOLDINGS IS APPLICABLE, AND 
COROLES18 IS INNAPLICABLE BECAUSE EXPIRATION OF DISCOVERY AND SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BRIEFING PRECEDED ANY ATTEMPT BY MS. BAUMANN TO DESIGNATE A 
LATE EXPERT WITHOUT LEAVE OR ANY ATTEMPT TO REQUEST LEAVE FOR BELATED 
EXPERTS. 
 
In response to pages 15 through 19 of Ms. Baumann’s brief, Smith’s Pharmacy 
submits the March 31, 2016 Utah Court of Appeals opinion of Sleepy Holdings LLC v. 
Mountain West Title et al., 370 P.3d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 2016) applies.  In Sleepy Holdings, 
at paragraph 22, the Court of Appeals agreed with the lower court and held that “rule 26 
applies here.”  Id. at 969.  The lower court relied on rule 26 of the U.R.C.P. in sanctioning 
Sleepy Holdings for failure to make and supplement the initial disclosures required by 
rules 26(a) and 26(e).  In Sleepy Holdings, at paragraph 23, the Court of Appeals refused 
to follow Coroles.  The Court of Appeals clarified that Coroles did not interpret or mention 
rule 26.  “Coroles did not purport to address what sanctions apply when a party fails to 
timely make or timely supplement initial disclosures under rules 26(a) or 26(e); in fact, it 
never mentions initial disclosures or rule 26.  Thus, Coroles does not control here.”  This 
analysis applies in Ms. Baumann’s appeal.  Ms. Baumann failed to timely make or 
supplement her expert designations or reports under rule 26.  Ms. Baumann stipulated 
                                                 
18 Sleepy Holdings LLC v. Mountain West Title et al., 370 P.3d 963 (Utah Ct. App. 2016); 
Coroles v. State, 349 P.3d 739 (Utah 2015). 
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that “Plaintiff’s Rule 26(a)(4)(A) expert disclosures shall be made no later than June 6, 
2014”; but she failed to do so.  (R.86, 100, 102, & 104 (emphasis added)).  The district 
court ordered that “Plaintiff was precluded by Rule 26(d)(4) from using any undisclosed 
witness, document, or material [or “any papers filed…after October 8, 2014”] in 
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendants.”  (R.525-529).  
Therefore, Coroles does not control here. 
Ms. Baumann’s comparison of her case to Coroles is inapposite.  The significant 
difference is that Coroles timely filed expert designations on the final day permitted by 
the scheduling order and timely served expert reports.  The district court later struck the 
experts upon the defendants’ motion.  Coroles designated her replacement experts three 
months before the deadline to complete expert depositions.  Thereafter, upon motion, 
the district court struck the replacement set of Coroles’ experts.  Given that the plaintiff 
had no requisite medical experts, the district granted defendants summary judgment. 19  
“Because these two rulings deprived Mrs. Coroles of any expert witnesses to testify at 
trial, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.”20  
Here, however, the district court did not exclude experts; rather, Ms. Baumann 
simply did not file any expert designations per the scheduling order deadline.  Then, 
                                                 
19 Id. at 741-742.   
20 Id. at 742 & 747.   
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months after that designation deadline, expert discovery expired.  In turn, after the close 
of all discovery, Defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment.  The parties 
briefed the motion.  The court granted it.  The district court decided to close the briefing 
for the summary judgment motion as of October 8, 2014, the date Dr. Tayler and Smith’s 
Pharmacy appropriately submitted the joint motion, a decision the lower court certainly 
had the discretion to render.  The district court was in no way abusive in limiting the 
briefing and filings it would consider to those filed within the time and manner allowed 
for a dispositive motion by rule.  There were no experts designated by Ms. Baumann 
within that time frame.21 
The manner in which this case unfolded since its original inception is distinctive.  
Based on the history of the case, the record, the permitted briefings and filings, the rules 
of procedure, and oral argument, the district court dismissed the case.  It was too late and 
contrary to the rules when Plaintiff then attempted to cure her problem by belatedly and 
impermissibly filing a report without leave of court.22  Plaintiff/Appellant did not timely 
                                                 
21 Nor was there ever any affidavit testimony of any purported expert ever submitted.   
22 Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:  “The motion, memoranda and 
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7.”  
With respect to motions including a summary judgment motion, Rule 7(c)(1) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:  “No other memoranda will be considered 
without leave of court.” 
Also, this Court has held:  “Although the trial court has discretion to consider 
issues raised in additional memoranda, such memoranda will [not] be considered 
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seek leave from the trial court or preserve the issue of late reports for appeal, yet 
Plaintiff/Appellant now-- counter to the Rules of Appellate Procedure and without basis—
seeks, in a roundabout but groundless way, this Supreme Court’s invalidation of the 
justifiable discretion exercised by the district court.  The discretion employed by the 
district court was completely within the bounds of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the district court’s authority and mandate to manage its court and preside over its cases. 
Stripping the district court of the type of discretion the lower court exercised in 
Ms. Baumann’s matter would in effect deprive the district court of the ability to issue and 
also hold the parties to its rulings and orders and manage discovery and the motions 
before it.  Ms. Baumann’s creative but unfounded attempt to shape this appeal into abuse 
of discretion in striking expert reports is unavailing.  This appeal can and should only focus 
on the preserved issue, which is the discretion the district court appropriately exercised 
in holding the parties, including Ms. Baumann, to the briefing and filings allowed for a 
dispositive motion brought following the conclusion of all discovery, making its decision 
                                                 
without leave of court.”  Soriano v. Graul, 2008 UT App 188, ¶ 12, 186 P.3d 960, 964 
(quotations and citations omitted)(alteration in original). 
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on those allowed pleadings, and precluding any unpermitted post hoc briefing and filings 
to be submitted. 
The district court and its proper use of discretion should be affirmed.  Granting 
summary judgment in this case was entirely appropriate in light of the fact that Plaintiff 
promised but failed to produce her experts during discovery, Plaintiff failed to designate 
experts on time, fact and expert discovery had expired, the pleadings for the summary 
judgment motion had closed, and unlike Coroles the only remaining procedure to occur 
was trial. 
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, along with Rule 16, provide the 
framework for expert discovery and the district court’s discretion in managing that 
discovery.  In fact, the Supreme Court Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 26 provide:  
Consequences of failure to disclose. Rule 26(d). If a party fails to disclose or 
supplement timely its discovery responses, that party cannot use the undisclosed 
witness, document, or material at any hearing or trial, absent proof that non-
disclosure was harmless or justified by good cause. More complete disclosures 
increase the likelihood that the case will be resolved justly, speedily, and 
inexpensively. Not being able to use evidence that a party fails properly to disclose 
provides a powerful incentive to make complete disclosures. This is true only if trial 
courts hold parties to this standard. Accordingly, although a trial court retains 
discretion to determine how properly to address this issue in a given case, the 
usual and expected result should be exclusion of the evidence. 
 
 Also, Ms. Baumann acknowledges in her own Appellant Brief that Rule 16 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure gives the district court “’broad authority to manage a 
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case.’”23  Ms. Baumann admits the Supreme Court’s emphasis that, under this rule, a 
district court may “’establish [ ] the time to complete discovery” through a scheduling 
order.24  Ms. Baumann further concedes the Supreme Court’s clarification that if a party 
fails to obey a scheduling order establishing a discovery deadline, the district court “‘may 
take any action authorized by Rule 37(e)’” of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.25  Ms. 
Baumann agrees that the Supreme Court permits sanctions for providing untimely 
discovery which would include “’prohibit[ing] the disobedient party … from introducing 
designated matters into evidence’ (e.g., exclusion of the evidence disclosed after the 
deadline)”.26  Finally, Ms. Baumann states the Coroles Court’s standard for sanctioning a 
party.  The standard lies in Rule 16(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure [“may” impose 
a sanction/exclude evidence] and not in Rule 37(h) [“shall not” be permitted to use the 
witness].27  In other words, this Court “has held that rule 16(d) is the source of the district 
court’s authority to sanction a party for producing untimely discovery under a scheduling 
order.”28  This Court held further that “Rule 16(d) provides that a court ‘may’ impose a 
                                                 
23 Aplt’s Br., p. 16;  Coroles 349 P.3d at 745 (quoting Boice ex rel. Boice v. Marble, 982 
P.2d 565 (Utah 1999). 
24 Aplt’s Br., p. 16;  Coroles 349 P.3d at 745 (quoting U.R.C.P 16(a)(9)). 
25 Aplt’s Br., p. 16;  Coroles at 745 (quoting U.R.C.P 16(d)). 
26 Aplt’s Br., p. 16 - 17;  Coroles at 745 (quoting Boice, P.2d at 565). 
27 Aplt’s Br., p. 17;  Coroles at 745. 
28 Coroles at 745-746.  
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sanction described in rule 37(e) for a failure to abide by the scheduling order.”29  Rule 
16(d)30 states in relevant part as follows: 
If a party … fails to obey an order, … if a party … is substantially unprepared 
to participate in a conference, the court, upon motion or its own initiative, 
may take any action authorized by Rule 37(e). 
 
Rule 37(e)(2)31 [now numbered 37(b) as of 5-1-15] in effect at the relevant time 
states in pertinent part as follows: 
Unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified, the court 
in which the action is pending may impose appropriate sanctions for the 
failure to follow its orders, including the following: 
(e)(2)(B) prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing 
designated claims or defenses or from introducing designated matters into 
evidence… 
(e)(2)(D) dismiss all or part of the action….  
 
 After conceding all of the above rules and district court discretion substantiated by 
this Court, Ms. Baumann paints with a broad brush in her Brief when making the  
sweeping but ungrounded declaration:  “It follows from all this that the District Court 
committed reversible error” when “it excluded the untimely expert witness report”.32  In 
fact, it does not follow from all the facts and circumstances in Ms. Baumann’s case.  Just 
                                                 
29 Coroles at 746. 
30 Rule 16, URCP. 
31 Rule 37, URCP. 
32 Aplt’s Br., p. 18. 
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the opposite.  First, there was no preserved issue or reversible error by the district court; 
the district never ruled on excluding expert designations or reports.  No designation or 
reports even existed during fact or expert discovery; and, moreover, no designation or 
reports ever existed during the time frame allowed for the summary judgment motion 
briefing.  Second, the history of the Baumann matter is not comparable to Coroles.  The 
unfolding of Ms. Baumann’s case was: no expert disclosures, discovery cutoff, close of 
motion for summary judgment pleadings, and then motion for summary judgment 
granted.  Coroles’ timeline, in stark contrast, was:  experts timely filed, experts stricken 
and motion for summary judgment by the defendants, new experts refiled by the plaintiff 
during summary judgment and three months before expert cutoff, experts stricken again, 
and then a decision on summary judgment.33 
                                                 
33 In addition to demonstrating that Coroles is inapplicable to the Baumann case and 
distinguishable on the facts and law applied in granting summary judgment, Smith’s 
Pharmacy further notes that even assuming, for the sake of argument, that this Court’s 
clarification of the standard of Rule 16 versus Rule 37 could apply to the facts and law 
noted in the Baumann case, Coroles should not be retroactively applied to this case.  
The district court made its rulings and decisions without the benefit of the Coroles 
decision, and the clarification of any applicable standards.  The trial court was operating 
under current, applicable case law, and to the extent it relied on any standard or case 
law clarified or abrogated by Coroles, the trial court justifiably relied on the state of the 
law pre-Coroles.  This Court should accordingly limit or prohibit the retroactive 
operation of Coroles to the review of this trial court’s decision – especially under an 
abuse of discretion standard.  See, e.g., Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 2009 UT 74, 223 
P.3d 1099, 1100-01; and Exxon Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2010 UT 16, 228 P.3d 
1246, 1248. 
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In Coroles, the district court’s preserved rulings on exclusion of experts was the 
error, and thus summary judgment by definition became an error as well.  Here, in Ms. 
Baumann’s case, the district court’s exercise of discretion was with respect to summary 
judgment (experts never timely arose and the issue was never preserved), and was fair 
and reasonable under all the circumstances.  The district court’s discretion was far from 
abused.  Rather, the district court contemplated myriad bases warranting its decision to 
contain the summary judgment pleadings and grant summary judgment: 
 Maturity and age of case.  R.479-480; 
 History and record of case.  R.496; 479-480. 
 Ms. Baumann’s multiple answers in her Responses to discovery, which she 
signed on February 20, 2014, refusing to produce experts and testimony at 
that time, but promising to later produce experts and testimony on the date 
required by the scheduling order.  R.513- 515. 
 Scheduling order stipulated to and signed by Ms. Baumann specifically 
requiring her expert designations and anticipated expert testimony by June 
6, 2014.  R.86-87; 100, 102, & 104; 98-106; 515-516. 
 Scheduling order signed by Ms. Baumann closing expert discovery on 
September 5, 2014.  R.86, 100, 102 & 104. 
 Rules 56 and 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.  R.525-529. 
 50 
 
 Summary judgment pleadings allowed, and prohibited, by the district court 
per its orders.  R.388; 399-402. 
 Two oral arguments.  R.463-486; 487-519. 
 District court’s offering Ms. Baumann the benefit of continuing oral 
argument and offering her an opportunity to retain a lawyer for the second 
oral argument.  R.472-473; 478-480. 
 District court’s rulings and Orders limiting the time frame, and materials, to 
be considered for summary judgment, and prohibiting subsequent papers 
or filings.  R.388; 399-402; 470; 472-473; 476-480. 
 Ms. Baumann’s statements to the court that she understood those 
limitations.  R.507; 477; 478-480. 
The district court’s discretion exercised on the issue preserved for appeal 
(summary judgment; not exclusion), the above-listed factors considered by the district 
court which demonstrate the justified and proper use of discretion, and the result of the 
district court’s discretion remain the same regardless of whether the district court applied 
discretion under a “may sanction” or a “shall sanction” standard.  As the statement of 
facts and factors listed above illustrate, the district court was fair and reasonable, not 
abusive, in its decisions and discretion.  Thus, the Court of Appeals, and the district court 
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and its proper use of discretion applied to grant Smith’s Pharmacy’s motion for summary 
judgment, should be affirmed. 
III. THE DECISION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION WAS CONSIDERED BY 
THE DISTRICT COURT AND IS IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED BY THE 
DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
  
Ms. Baumann states in her appellate brief that during oral argument on summary 
judgment she asserted the district court should decide summary judgment based on the 
record that she had submitted, including the decision of the Social Security Administration 
(“SSA”).34  On March 13, 2014, the Social Security Administration Office of Disability 
Adjudication and Review issued a Notice of Decision qualifying Ms. Baumann for disability 
payments.  Ms. Baumann subsequently served the Notice of Decision along with the 
related transcript of the decision on both Defendants.35  In addition to her oral argument, 
Ms. Baumann also cited to the SSA decision in her “Statement Opposing Defendant’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment” filed on September 29, 2014.36  As Smith’s Pharmacy 
pointed out in the Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed 
on October 8, 2014, “[t]he fact that [Ms. Baumann] has had a ruling before the [SSA] is 
                                                 
34 Aplt’s Br., p. 11; 9 - 10.   
35 R.152, 323 [Subparagraph I].   
36 R.152.  The existence of the SSA decision, and Ms. Baumann’s points related to the 
decision, were therefore not subject to the order entered by the district court on 
December 22, 2014 [R.402] wherein the district court ruled that it would not consider 
anything filed by Ms. Baumann after October 8, 2014.   
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irrelevant to this case and does not provide any basis for an ability to make expert 
disclosures in this case.”37  A decision by the SSA determining the existence of disability 
does not review the standards of care related to a pharmacy or pharmacist, whether a 
breach of a standard of care for a pharmacy occurred, and whether a claimant’s disability 
was proximately caused by a breach in a pharmacy’s standard of care.  Rather, a disability 
decision by the SSA is exactly that – it is an exclusive determination of whether a disability 
exists and whether a claimant is entitled to disability payments.  More important, a 
decision of the SSA does not provide the expert information required to be disclosed by 
Rule 2638 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.  Besides, Ms. Baumann’s argument section 
in her appellate brief does not even attempt to construe any of Ms. Baumann’s SSA 
documents as expert reports or Rule 26 compliant.  She only seeks now on appeal for 
permission to file late designations and reports (non SSA related) against Dr. Tayler and 
                                                 
37 R.155. 
38 Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4)(A) provides “[a] party shall, without waiting for a discovery 
request, serve on the other parties the following information regarding any person who 
may be used at trial to present evidence under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
and who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or 
whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony: (i) 
the expert’s name and qualifications, including a list of all publications authored within 
the preceding 10 years, and a list of any other cases in which the expert has testified as 
an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years, (ii) a brief summary 
of the opinions to which the witness is expected to testify, (iii) all data and other 
information that will be relied upon by the witness in forming those opinions, and (iv) 
the compensation to be paid for the witness’s study and testimony.”   
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Smith’s Pharmacy.  Consequently, the existence of a decision by the SSA has absolutely 
no bearing on Ms. Baumann’s appeal. 
IV. MS. BAUMANN’S PRO SE REPRESENTATION HAS NO IMPACT ON THIS APPEAL. 
Ms. Baumann represented herself before the district court.  A self-represented 
party is “entitled to every consideration that may reasonably be indulged.”39  However, 
“reasonable indulgence is not unlimited indulgence” and courts are required “to redress 
the ongoing consequences of [a self-represented] party’s decision to function in a 
capacity for which [s]he is not trained.”40  Furthermore, “a party who represents 
[her]self will be held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified 
member of the bar.’”41 
In this case, the parties specifically stipulated that Ms. Baumann was to serve her 
expert reports by no later than June 6, 2014.42  The record also shows that Smith’s 
Pharmacy made a discovery request to Ms. Baumann asking that she “[p]roduce a copy 
                                                 
39 Sivulich v. Dep’t of Workforce Services, 2015 UT App 101, ¶ 6, 2015 Utah App, LEXIS 
101 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).   
40 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).   
41 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).   
42 See Stipulation for Additional Time to Conduct Standard Discovery, R.88 
[subparagraph b]. Smith’s Pharmacy notes that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
normally do not provide a date certain for parties to make expert disclosures. Rather, 
Rule 26 simply provides a number of days after the close of fact discovery that a party 
with a burden of proof is to make expert disclosures.  See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4)(C).   
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of all documents, reports, or opinions you have received from each expert witness you 
intend to call to testify at the trial…of this action.”43  In her response made on February 
20, 2014, Ms. Baumann stated that she would produce the requested documents “when 
scheduled to do so by [the] case management order.”  Ms. Baumann’s Brief asserts that 
she filed “an expert report and curriculum vitae applicable to the alleged breaches and 
failures by the Pharmacy” 44 on November 17, 2014, but Ms. Baumann at the time, and 
even her appellate brief now, completely ignore the district court’s myriad grounds for, 
and orders that, no such untimely filings post October 8, 2014 would be considered for 
Defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment.45  Moreover, during oral argument, 
Ms. Baumann asserted that no expert witness report was to “save quite a few thousand 
dollars” and because she “thought that the facts would speak for themselves and the 
Defense would want to move forward with also a less expensive and more timely 
speedier way of getting to resolution to this case…”46  Additionally, within the papers 
filed by Ms. Baumann in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Ms. 
Baumann cites a Utah Supreme Court decision for the proposition that “[e]xpert 
                                                 
43 R.519 [p. 7:2-12]. 
44 Aplt’s Br., p. 10.   
45 R.388; 401; 472-473; 476; 468-478; 478-480. 
46 R.519 [p. 22:18-25].   
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testimony…is not required in cases where the causal connection between the alleged 
negligence and the harm caused is a matter of common knowledge.”47 
Thus, contrary to Ms. Baumann’s assertion on appeal, the record shows that Ms. 
Baumann’s decision to not properly and timely designate experts and provide expert 
reports related to her claims against Smith’s Pharmacy was intentional because she 
desired to avoid expenses and because she believed that the law did not require experts 
in this case.  The district court correctly, and specifically, ruled that the applicable 
standard of care and whether a breach of that standard of care proximately caused Ms. 
Baumann’s alleged injuries was not within the common knowledge of laypersons and 
that expert testimony was required in this case.48  Providing Ms. Baumann’s actions 
before the district court with all reasonable indulgences, the record is clear that the 
issue that Ms. Baumann seeks appellate review of was not preserved, that Ms. Baumann 
never timely requested leave to make expert disclosures related to her claims against 
Smith’s Pharmacy, that Ms. Baumann in fact believed expert testimony was not required 
for her claims against Smith’s Pharmacy, and that Ms. Baumann did not timely (or in 
accordance with the November 17, 2014 orders of the district court, the stipulated 
scheduling order, the fact and expert discovery period, or Ms. Baumann’s own promises 
                                                 
47 R.319. 
48 R.527. 
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in her Responses to discovery) seek to use expert testimony related to her claims 
against Smith’s Pharmacy.  Ms. Baumann, while self-represented before the district 
court, ultimately must be held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any 
qualified member of the bar.  The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals and the decision 
of the district court should, therefore, be affirmed. 
V.  THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE DISTRICT COURT 
DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN APPLYING RULE 26(D)(4). 
 
Ms. Baumann argues that the Court of Appeals erred in its application and 
analysis of Rule 26(d)(4).  Ms. Baumann contends that the Court of Appeals was 
incorrect to uphold the district court’s application of Rule 26(d)(4), under an abuse of 
discretion standard, based on the district court’s finding that Ms. Baumann’s failure to 
disclose lacked any good-cause justification.  Ms. Baumann asserts that the Court of 
Appeals erred by not reading the language of Rule 26(d)(4) to also require the district 
court to consider whether Ms. Baumann’s failure to disclose was harmless.  Ms. 
Baumann, in turn, suggests (only on appeal) that her failure to disclose was harmless 
and that the district court abused its discretion below. 
However, this argument is without merit.  The Court of Appeals rejected Ms. 
Baumann’s argument when, in a footnote, it explained: 
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“Baumann also argues that in addition to making a finding of no good cause, the 
district court was also required to make a finding of harmfulness.  This, however, 
is not the case.  See Sleepy Holdings LLC v. Mountain West Title, 2016 UT App 62, 
¶ 21, 370 P.3d 963.  It is well settled that a district court’s exclusion of materials 
may be supported if the court makes a finding that there is either no good cause 
for the failure or that the failure is harmful.  See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d)(4) 
(explaining that a “party may not use the undisclosed witness, document or 
material at any hearing or trial unless the failure is harmless or the party shows 
good cause for the failure.”  (emphasis added)); Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 
2009 UT 52, ¶ 35, 215 P.3d 933.  Thus, it is unnecessary for us to examine 
whether there was harm.  This is not to suggest that the failure was harmless.” 
 
(See Addendum B, Baumann, 381 P.3d at footnote 8).  The Court of Appeals 
further concluded in a footnote that: 
“Baumann does not contest the district court’s determination that expert witness 
testimony was necessary to prove her claims and, thus, that summary judgment 
was appropriate in the absence of such testimony, nor does Baumann contest the 
court’s ruling that there was no good cause for her failure to disclose her expert 
witnesses.  We, therefore, do not address those issues here.” 
 
(See Addendum B, Baumann, 381 P.3d at footnote 4; emphasis added).  This Court, as 
with the Utah Court of Appeals, need not address this issue. 
 The Court of Appeals aptly explained that, “contrary to Baumann’s argument to 
the district court that bypassing her obligation to disclose her expert witness would 
have led to a speedier resolution in this case, Utah’s supreme court-appointed advisory 
committee on the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure has stated that 
[m]ore complete disclosures increase the likelihood that the case will be 
resolved justly, speedily, and inexpensively. Not being able to use 
evidence that a party fails properly to disclose provides a powerful 
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incentive to make complete disclosures. This is true only if trial courts 
hold parties to this standard. Accordingly, although a trial court retains 
discretion to determine how properly to address this issue in a given 
case, the usual and expected result should be exclusion of the evidence. 
 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26 (2012) advisory committee’s notes to 2011 amendments.”  
(Addendum B, Baumann, 381 P.3d at 1140.) 
Indeed, a district court has “broad discretion in selecting and imposing sanctions 
for discovery violations” under Rule 26.  Tuck v. Godfrey, 981 P.2d 407, 411 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1999)(citation an internal quotation marks omitted).  Under the extensive 
discretion given to district courts when applying discovery and motion rules, the Court 
of Appeals was correct to find, under all the circumstances of this case, that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in its application of Rule 26(d)(4) because there was no 
good cause for Ms. Baumann’s failure to disclose and that harmlessness did not need to 
be examined on appeal. 
 Yet, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court of Appeals should 
have examined whether there was harm, or whether the district court was required to 
make a specific finding under the rule that Ms. Baumann’s failure to disclose was not 
harmless, the issue on appeal still ultimately turns on whether there is a sufficient 
evidentiary basis supporting the district court’s exercise of its broad discretion.  See 
Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., 2008 UT 82, ¶29, 199 P.3d 957, 966 (discussing 
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that a failure to make a specific factual finding in exercising discretion “is not always 
grounds for reversal . . . if a full understanding of the issues on appeal can nevertheless 
be determined by the appellate court”(quotations and citations omitted)).  Here, 
considering the entire record, the district court’s exercise of discretion should not be 
disturbed on appeal.  There was no abuse of discretion at all, let alone a clear abuse of 
discretion which would mandate reversal.  See id. at ¶23 (stating that appellate courts 
will “overturn a sanction only in cases evidencing a clear abuse of discretion”). 
 Appellate courts in Utah afford district courts “‘a great deal of latitude in 
determining the most fair and efficient manner to conduct court business’ because the 
district court judge ‘is in the best position to evaluate the status of his [or her] cases, as 
well as the attitudes, motives, and credibility of the parties.’”  Bodell Const. Co. v. 
Robbins, 2009 UT 52, ¶ 35, 215 P.3d 933, 943 (citations omitted)(alterations in original).  
Thus, where a district court issues orders, manages discovery, handles dispositive 
motions, and imposes discovery sanctions under the rules, Utah’s appellate courts will 
determine that a district court “‘has abused its discretion in choosing which sanction to 
impose only if there is either an erroneous conclusion of law or no evidentiary basis for 
the [district] court's ruling.’”  Id. (alterations in original)(citations omitted).  Appellate 
courts should otherwise not second guess the district court’s exercise of discretion 
where the decision is adequately supported by the evidence and record. 
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 Here, there is more than a sufficient evidentiary basis in the record regarding 
how the district court governed this case, discovery, and briefing on summary judgment 
to conclude that the district court’s application of Rule 26(d)(4) was not abusive.  Ms. 
Baumann, not Smith’s Pharmacy, bears the burden of establishing that the failure is 
harmless or that there was good cause for her failure.  However, Ms. Baumann did not 
meet her burden in front of the district court, nor has she met it here on appeal.  Some 
of the factors and arguments Ms. Baumann asserts on appeal to show the failure to 
disclose was harmless or that it was justified by good cause were items she failed to 
raise and preserve before the trial court.  Nevertheless, assessing the totality of the 
circumstances in front of the district court, and what it observed from its position in 
dealing with the case and the parties, no abuse of discretion can be found in its 
application of Rule 26(d)(4). 
 Ms. Baumann failed to disclose experts or expert reports within the requisite 
discovery period, or even after a stipulated extension of the scheduling order.  In fact, it 
was not until five weeks after all briefing had been concluded and the motion for 
summary judgment was submitted that Baumann attempted to file a report with the 
court on the day of oral argument.  The report was not filed until several months after 
designations were due and expert discovery had been concluded and at a stage when 
the Defendants were not able to conduct further discovery to rebut the expert.  While, 
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hypothetically, the district court could in its discretion opt to reopen discovery and 
reopen briefing on a dispositive motion, the court is not, under its discretion, obligated 
to do so nor did it here.  Ms. Baumann never even timely sought leave to file late expert 
designations, serve belated expert reports, or restart discovery. 
  In light of all the details of this particular case, the court justifiably employed 
Rule 26(d)(4), and it remained properly within the bounds of its discretion.  The record 
amply supports the court’s application of the rules of procedure, and there is no clear 
abuse of discretion when considering all the circumstances under which the court 
managed this unique matter.  Despite her endeavor on appeal to suggest non-disclosure 
was harmless, in the end nothing in the record suggests that Ms. Baumann possessed 
good cause to excuse her failure to disclose or that her failure was harmless.  When 
viewing the entire picture, the trial and appellate courts’ decisions below should not be 
overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Based upon the foregoing, Smith’s Pharmacy respectfully requests that the Utah 
Court of Appeals’ opinion be affirmed and the district court’s Order Granting 
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Order of Final Judgment be affirmed. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(b).  Summary Judgment.  For defending party. 
A party against whom a claim … is asserted … may, at any time, move for 
summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).  Summary Judgment.  Motion and proceedings 
thereon. 
The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7.  
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1).  Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda…. 
All motions…shall be accompanied by a supporting memorandum.  Within 
14 days after service of the motion and supporting memorandum, a party 
opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in opposition.  Within 7 
days after service of the memorandum in opposition, the moving party 
may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to rebuttal of 
matters raised in the memorandum in opposition.  No other memoranda 
will be considered without leave of court.  A party may attach a proposed 
order to its initial memorandum. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 16(d).  Pretrial conferences.  Sanctions. 
If a party or a party’s attorney fails to obey an order, if a party or a party’s 
attorney fails to attend a conference, if a party or a party’s attorney is 
substantially unprepared to participate in a conference, or if a party or a 
party’s attorney fails to participate in good faith, the court, upon motion 
or its own initiative, may take any action authorized by Rule 37(e). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2).  Discovery and disclosure motions; Sanctions.  
Failure to comply with order.  (2014)1 
Sanctions by the court in which action is pending.  Unless the court finds 
that the failure was substantially justified, the court in which the actions is 
pending may impose appropriate sanctions for the failure to follow its 
orders, including the following:  
                                                 
1 Renumbered May 1, 2015 to Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b). 
(e)(2)(B) prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing 
designated claims or defenses or from introducing designated matters into 
evidence; 
(e)(2)(D) dismiss all or part of the action, strike all or part of the pleadings, 
or render judgment by default on all or part of the action; 
Utah R. Civ. P.  37(h).  Discovery and disclosure motions; Sanctions.  
Failure to disclose. (2014)2 
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material . . . as 
required by Rule 26(d), that party shall not be permitted to use the 
witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to 
disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to 
disclose. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 29.  Stipulations regarding disclosure and discovery 
procedure. 
The parties may modify the limits and procedures for disclosure and 
discovery by filing, before the close of standard discovery and after 
reaching the limits of standard discovery imposed by these rules, a 
stipulated statement that the extraordinary discovery is necessary and 
proportional under Rule 26(b)(2) and that each party has reviewed and 
approved a discovery budget.  Stipulations extending the time for 
disclosure or discovery do not require a statement regarding 
proportionality or discovery budgets.  Stipulations extending the time for 
or limits of disclosure or discovery require court approval only if the 
extension would interfere with a court order for completion of discovery 
or with the date of a hearing or trial. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4)(C).  General provisions governing disclosure and 
discovery.  Timing for expert discovery. 
The party who bears the burden of proof on the issue for which expert 
testimony is offered shall serve on the other parties the information 
required by paragraph (a)(4)(A) within seven days after the close of the 
fact discovery. 
                                                 
2 On May 1, 2015, Rule 37 was renumbered.  The version of Rule 37 in effect prior to 
May 1, 2015 is quoted above. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d)(4).  General provisions governing disclosure and 
discovery.  Requirements for disclosure or response; disclosure or response 
by an organization; failure to disclose; initial and supplemental disclosures 
and responses. 
If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a disclosure or response 
to discovery, that party may not use the undisclosed witness, document or 
material at any hearing or trial unless the failure is harmless or the party 
shows good cause for the failure. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 
 The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(a). 
RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
 
 Smith’s Pharmacy does not agree with Ms. Baumann’s Statement of The Issues.  
According to Ms. Baumann, the issues on appeal are essentially “[w]hether the Court of 
Appeals erred in concluding that the District Court properly applied Rule 26(a)(4)…rather 
than Rule 16(d)…” and “whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Appellant from using an untimely 
expert report under Rule 26(d)….”  Brief of Appellant (“Aplt’s Br.”), p.1-2.  However, Ms. 
Baumann failed to provide sufficient citation to the record demonstrating that Ms. 
Baumann preserved these issues in the trial court as required by Rule 24(a)(5)(A) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.  Ms. Baumann has failed to provide supportable 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ADDENDUM A 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(b).  Summary Judgment.  For defending party. 
A party against whom a claim … is asserted … may, at any time, move for 
summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).  Summary Judgment.  Motion and proceedings 
thereon. 
The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7.  
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1).  Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda…. 
All motions…shall be accompanied by a supporting memorandum.  Within 
14 days after service of the motion and supporting memorandum, a party 
opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in opposition.  Within 7 
days after service of the memorandum in opposition, the moving party 
may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to rebuttal of 
matters raised in the memorandum in opposition.  No other memoranda 
will be considered without leave of court.  A party may attach a proposed 
order to its initial memorandum. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 16(d).  Pretrial conferences.  Sanctions. 
If a party or a party’s attorney fails to obey an order, if a party or a party’s 
attorney fails to attend a conference, if a party or a party’s attorney is 
substantially unprepared to participate in a conference, or if a party or a 
party’s attorney fails to participate in good faith, the court, upon motion 
or its own initiative, may take any action authorized by Rule 37(e). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2).  Discovery and disclosure motions; Sanctions.  
Failure to comply with order.  (2014)1 
Sanctions by the court in which action is pending.  Unless the court finds 
that the failure was substantially justified, the court in which the actions is 
pending may impose appropriate sanctions for the failure to follow its 
orders, including the following:  
                                                 
1 Renumbered May 1, 2015 to Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b). 
(e)(2)(B) prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing 
designated claims or defenses or from introducing designated matters into 
evidence; 
(e)(2)(D) dismiss all or part of the action, strike all or part of the pleadings, 
or render judgment by default on all or part of the action; 
Utah R. Civ. P.  37(h).  Discovery and disclosure motions; Sanctions.  
Failure to disclose. (2014)2 
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material . . . as 
required by Rule 26(d), that party shall not be permitted to use the 
witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to 
disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to 
disclose. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 29.  Stipulations regarding disclosure and discovery 
procedure. 
The parties may modify the limits and procedures for disclosure and 
discovery by filing, before the close of standard discovery and after 
reaching the limits of standard discovery imposed by these rules, a 
stipulated statement that the extraordinary discovery is necessary and 
proportional under Rule 26(b)(2) and that each party has reviewed and 
approved a discovery budget.  Stipulations extending the time for 
disclosure or discovery do not require a statement regarding 
proportionality or discovery budgets.  Stipulations extending the time for 
or limits of disclosure or discovery require court approval only if the 
extension would interfere with a court order for completion of discovery 
or with the date of a hearing or trial. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4)(C).  General provisions governing disclosure and 
discovery.  Timing for expert discovery. 
The party who bears the burden of proof on the issue for which expert 
testimony is offered shall serve on the other parties the information 
required by paragraph (a)(4)(A) within seven days after the close of the 
fact discovery. 
                                                 
2 On May 1, 2015, Rule 37 was renumbered.  The version of Rule 37 in effect prior to 
May 1, 2015 is quoted above. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d)(4).  General provisions governing disclosure and 
discovery.  Requirements for disclosure or response; disclosure or response 
by an organization; failure to disclose; initial and supplemental disclosures 
and responses. 
If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a disclosure or response 
to discovery, that party may not use the undisclosed witness, document or 
material at any hearing or trial unless the failure is harmless or the party 
shows good cause for the failure. 
 
 
